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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990520-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
MICHAEL WHITEMAN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction of criminal homicide, murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for a new trial 
based upon newly discovered evidence? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court has a wide range of discretion in 
determining whether newly discovered evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial. We 
will uphold the trial court's decision if it is within the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
Issue 2: Was the trial court required to instruct the jury on a lesser-included 
offense when defendant expressly declined to request such an instruction? 
Standard of Review: Defendant's failure to object to the jury instructions and 
his explicit rejection of a lesser-included instruction waives any challenge to the 
instructions on appeal. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995) 
("Because defendant failed to object to the instruction at trial, we can reach the issue 
only to avoid manifest injustice. However, the manifest injustice exception has no 
application in cases in which the defendant invited the very error complained of on 
appeal/'). 
Issue 3: Was defendant's counsel ineffective in failing to conduct a proper 
investigation, request a lesser-included instruction, present mitigating evidence, or 
adequately cross-examine witnesses? 
Standard of Review: "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed 
question of law and fact." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) {citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)). In this case, the trial court ruled 
on defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a motion for a 
new trial. "[W]hen a trial court has heard a motion for a new trial based on an 
ineffective assistance claim, an appellate court will not set aside the findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990). 
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Issue 4: Was defendant denied his constitutional right to due process because of 
the state's failure to provide discovery? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new 
trial based upon an alleged failure to provide discovery is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,128, 979 P.2d 799. 
Issue 5: Is defendant's conviction supported by sufficient evidence? 
Standard of Review: In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant 
"'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate 
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support 
the verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App. 305,1 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citation 
omitted) {quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). This Court 
"will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is 'so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt" that the defendant committed the crime.'" State v. Harley, 1999 
UT App. 197,19, 982 P.2d 1145 (quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994) and State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The issues raised in this appeal do not require consideration of the text of any 
constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29, 1993, defendant was charged with one count of criminal homicide, 
murder, and was later convicted by a jury. Defendant was sentenced to a term of five 
years to life on November 22, 1993 (R.233). Defendant filed a motion for new trial 
(R.236). A hearing on this motion was continued several times for substitution of 
counsel, to obtain a trial transcript, and for additional briefing of an amended motion 
for new trial, and a motion for resentencing. Following a hearing on March 10, 1997, 
these motions were denied by the trial court (R.1041). 
Defendant appealed (R.1032), but a transcript of his sentencing hearing could 
not be produced (R.1051). The Supreme Court therefore remanded the case to the trial 
court to hold another sentencing hearing (R.1059). Following remand, defendant filed 
a motion to reduce his conviction from criminal homicide to manslaughter, a second 
degree felony (R.1079), and a renewed motion for new trial (R.1083). At a sentencing 
hearing held on April 5, 1999, the trial court denied these motions and again sentenced 
defendant to a prison term of five years to life (R. 1256:70, 1241). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 1242). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April, 1993, defendant had been homeless for several years, including the 
preceding two years he had spent living in Salt Lake City (R. 1253:63). Defendant 
spent much of his time downtown in Pioneer Park (R. 1253:69). 
4 
At about 8:30 a.m. on April 26, 1993, defendant went to the Expomart building 
in downtown Salt Lake City, where the social services office was located (R. 1251:177). 
A security officer, Harry Lee, and a social services supervisor, Vicky Green, were 
smoking outside the social services office when defendant approached and started 
talking to them (R. 1251:178). Lee knew defendant because he had talked with him 
several times before (R. 1251:177). On this occasion, defendant told Lee that he was 
just going to pick up his knife, so he did not know if he would have time to see his 
caseworker at social services (R. 1251:179). Defendant said that he "had this problem 
at the park that he was going to get straight after he got his knife." Id. 
Several hours later, defendant was talking with an acquaintance, Clifton Jones, 
who was seated at a bench in the central area of Pioneer Park (R. 1253:91). An 
Hispanic male named Alex Gomez approached, and defendant became involved in a 
heated argument with him1 (R. 1252:160, 165, 169). 
Gomez did not appear to be armed with any weapon (R. 1252:164). Defendant 
was armed with a large knife that he carried in plain view in a sheath attached to his 
belt (R. 1252:163). 
1
 Gomez was known by several names, and is referred to in the transcript by 
various people as Gomez (R. 1252:191, 1253:16, 23), Ramirez (R. 1252:159) and Lopez 
(R. 1253:60, 152). 
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Both defendant and Gomez had been drinking (R. 1253:93), and made derogatory 
and provocative comments to each other (R. 1252:165). At one point, defendant told 
Jones that he was going to "knock [Gomez] down," and Jones heard Gomez make a 
similar threat to defendant (R. 1252:168-69). Jones felt that the argument would likely 
escalate into a fight, and asked defendant and Gomez to "take their argument 
somewhere else" (R. 1252:161). Defendant and Gomez then left the area, continuing 
their argument, but then splitting up (R. 1252:180-81). 
Defendant walked toward the south side of the park and sat in his customary spot 
near some trees. He sat next to a friend, with whom he began sharing a drink 
(R. 1253:101-02). Defendant took his knife out of the sheath and put it on the ground 
(R. 1253:103). A group of defendant's friends were standing close by, within a few feet 
(R. 1253:101-02, 164-65). 
Gomez, accompanied by two other Hispanic males, approached the standing 
group of defendant's friends, and a heated argument ensued between the two groups. 
There was some pushing and shoving, which escalated and became more intense, 
although the two men accompanying Gomez mostly stood back (R.1251:251-52, 
1253:168). Neither Gomez nor the other two Hispanics appeared to be armed 
(1253:169). 
At some point during this dispute, Gomez made a comment to defendant, and 
defendant and his friend stood up (R. 1253:170). Defendant took a couple of steps 
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forward, and Gomez responded by approaching defendant (R. 1251:223-24, 1253:170-
71). Defendant stepped toward Gomez, raising his fists (R. 1251:224, 1253:174). The 
other two Hispanics did not approach defendant with Gomez, and were not close by at 
this point (R. 1251:263). Gomez hit defendant in the face with his fist, knocking 
defendant back (R. 1251:226). Defendant then reached down to the ground, picked up 
his knife, and moved toward Gomez (1251:215, 226). Gomez raised his empty hands, 
stepping back three or four feet. Id. Defendant took several steps forward with the 
knife and stabbed Gomez deeply in the chest (R. 1251:232-33). Gomez died from this 
wound (R. 1252:13). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in 
finding that the "new evidence" defendant has produced is insufficient to warrant a new 
trial. Defendant's evidence regarding the victim's alleged gang membership is 
insufficient to justify a new trial because it does nothing more than add a name, 
"Surenos," to the extensive testimony presented at trial that Hispanic drug dealers were 
violent and operated in small groups to provide backup during drug deals. 
The proposed additional testimony likewise is not significant. The record fully 
supports the trial court's finding that the testimony of Julian Valdez is cumulative, not 
credible, and actually supports the State's case. The trial court also found that 
defendant failed to present admissible evidence of what Gilmar Pinelo would say if he 
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were to testify, and the statements which defendant asserts Pinelo made in a hearsay 
conversation with defendant are contradicted by the record. 
Defendant's allegation that new evidence exists of a deal between the prosecutor 
and one of the State's witnesses is insufficient to warrant a new trial because defendant 
has failed to provide any evidence of such a deal, and the record shows that no such 
deal was ever made. 
Point II. Defendant's assertion that he requested a jury instruction on a lesser-
included offense is contradicted by the record, which shows that defendant and his 
counsel made a well-considered decision not to ask for such an instruction. 
Defendant's explicit acknowledgment to the trial court that no lesser-included 
instruction should be given precludes appellate review of this issue. 
Further, it was not error for the court to accept defendant's decision not to 
instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. Defendant made a reasonable strategic 
decision to force the jury to either convict defendant of the greater offense or acquit 
him altogether. 
Point III. Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Defendant 
has failed to point out investigative leads that his attorneys failed to pursue, and has not 
produced any significant evidence that his attorneys unreasonably failed to uncover. 
Defendant's attorneys fully considered the issue of whether to request a lesser-included 
instruction, and consulted with defendant in making this decision. The trial court found 
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that defendant's decision not to request the instruction was a reasonable strategic 
choice. Defendant has failed to produce any evidence of an alleged mental deficiency, 
or show that a defense based upon such a deficiency was the only reasonable option. 
Defendant has likewise failed to produce any evidence that his attorneys failed to 
properly cross-examine witnesses, instead only speculating about discrepancies in 
testimony that are not evident in the record. 
Point IV. There is no evidence that the prosecutor violated his pre-trial duty to 
disclose all reasonably exculpatory evidence. Defendant's attorneys acknowledged that 
the prosecutor disclosed to them all reports, transcripts, and tape recordings of 
interviews. Defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor failed to disclose to 
defendant any evidence, let alone that the prosecutor withheld "constitutionally 
significant" evidence which would have resulted in a reasonable probability of an 
acquittal. 
Point V. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant recites only a 
limited version of the evidence supporting his theory of self-defense. He has therefore 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of his conviction, and the court should decline 
to consider this claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AS 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESENT NEW EVIDENCE THAT 
WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN ACQUITTAL ON RETRIAL 
Defendant asserts that, since his trial, he has found sufficient new evidence to 
justify nullifying the jury's verdict and granting him a new trial. Brief of Appellant, pp. 
15-23. The standard for granting a new trial based upon new evidence is a high one: 
The legal standard to be applied when considering a motion for a new 
trial based on newly-discovered evidence is that the moving party must 
show that the evidence satisfies the following factors: (i) it could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial; (ii) 
it is not merely cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result 
probable on retrial. 
State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, 1 5, 984 P.2d 975 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 
793 (Utah 1991) and State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (1969)). Here, the trial court 
fully considered defendant's proffered new evidence, and found that it was insufficient 
to warrant a new trial because it was not probable that a different verdict would result if 
it were presented (R. 1255:89) (Addendum A). 
The trial court's finding that defendant's proffered new evidence would not 
result in a different verdict on retrial is reviewed with great deference on appeal. "A 
trial court has a wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered 
evidence entitles a litigant to a new trial. We will uphold the trial court's decision if it 
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is within the limits of reasonability." State v. Jiron, 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 
1994) (citations omitted). See also James, 819 P.2d at 793 ("Trial judges are given a 
wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered evidence or errors 
which occurred within a trial merit the grant of a new trial. We assume that the trial 
court exercised proper discretion unless the record clearly shows the contrary.").2 
In support of his motion for a new trial, defendant claims that he has uncovered 
three types of new evidence: (a) evidence of the victim's membership in a specific 
street gang; (b) testimony from two additional witnesses alleged to have been present in 
the park on the day of the murder; and (c) evidence regarding the post-trial disposition 
of a state witness's DUI offense. The trial court properly found that none of this 
evidence is sufficient to justify a new trial. 
2
 In addressing the standard of review, defendant asserts that his motion for a 
new trial presents a mixed question of fact and law, and that the trial court's ruling is 
only entitled to "some deference," citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 
1994). However, Pena provides only a general discussion of the broad range of 
appellate review of different issues, and does not imply a lesser level of deference in 
reviewing a trial court's resolution of a motion for new trial based upon new evidence. 
Defendant does not dispute that the trial court applied the correct legal standard in 
ruling on his motion, and alleges error only in the court's evaluation of whether the 
new evidence is likely to result in a different verdict on retrial. The trial court is given 
"a wide range of discretion" in ruling on this factual issue, as noted above. See Penay 
869 P.2d at 938 ("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a decision by 
the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence."). 
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A. Evidence of the victim's alleged gang membership. 
Defendant claims that there is new evidence that the victim was a member of a 
street gang named "Surenos." Brief of Appellant, pp. 8, 18. However, the evidence 
cited by defendant does not directly relate to the victim's behavior, and is entirely 
cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial concerning defendant's association with 
other Hispanics at the park. 
As new evidence of the victim's gang membership, defendant cites to the fact 
that the victim had tattoos associated with gang membership. However, the existence 
of these tattoos is not new evidence, since the medical report documenting their 
existence was known prior to trial and disclosed to defendant. See Affidavit of Mark 
Moffat, 1 12 (R.887) (Addendum C). 
Accordingly, the only "new" evidence submitted on this issue by defendant is 
the affidavit of Chuck Gilbert, a member of the Salt Lake City Metro Gang Unit, which 
implies a connection between the victim's tattoos and the Surenos gang. Gilbert's 
affidavit indicates that this gang was active in the early 1990fs, but does not offer any 
specific evidence about the victim in this case, or about extent of the victim's 
involvement in the Surenos gang in 1993.3 Indeed, defendant stipulated that Gilbert 
3
 In fact, any implication from the tattoo and Gilbert's affidavit that the victim 
was an active member of the Surenos gang is directly contradicted by defendant's other 
proffered "new" evidence, the statements of Julian Valdez. In his interviews with 
(continued...) 
12 
was not a member of the Metro Gang Unit in 1993, and had never even seen gang 
members in Pioneer Park (R. 1255:6). Gilbert's affidavit does not appear to be 
admissible evidence, as it reflects his speculation about what he thought gang activity 
might have been in 1993, based upon his later involvement in the Metro Gang Unit. 
Id. See State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72 , 1 17, 984 P.2d 975 (hearing on request for new 
trial must be held only if new admissible evidence is found). 
In any event, the proffered evidence concerning the Surenos gang is cumulative. 
The only "new" evidence offered through the testimony of Officer Chuck Gilbert is 
that the street gang associated with the victim's tattoos was violent, sold drugs, and 
operated in groups of three to five people to provide backup during drug deals. Gilbert 
Affidavit, 11 12-15 (R.794-95). The behavior of the Hispanic groups in the park was 
repeatedly described in similar ways by defendant, two other defense witnesses, and 
one of the State's own witnesses. This testimony therefore adds nothing significant to 
the evidence presented at trial. 
Defendant himself testified extensively concerning the organized violence and 
drug dealing by the victim and other Hispanics at the park. Defendant testified that 
3(...continued) 
defendant's counsel and investigators, Valdez states that the victim had no organization 
to back him up, and was forced to go around the park pleading for help from people, 
like Valdez, whom he hardly even knew. See discussion of Valdez evidence, infra at 
pp. 20-22. 
13 
there were violent drug dealers in the park and that they were mostly "Mexican 
nationals" (R. 1253:73). These Hispanics controlled the drug trade in the park 
(R. 1253:77), and would congregate next to the park under the Fourth South viaduct. 
Id. Defendant further testified that the Hispanics would sell drugs in groups of two, 
three, four, and five (R. 1253:78), and that the purpose of these small groups was to 
provide backup during drug transactions (R. 1253:78-79). Defendant also testified that 
the Hispanics were well organized and tightly bonded together (R. 1253:82-83). 
Defendant's testimony regarding the behavior of Hispanics in the park was 
corroborated by other witnesses. Dale Olsen testified that he was in the park often, and 
described the actions of Hispanics in the park. He testified that most of the Hispanics 
were involved in drug sales, and that they worked in groups of three. Olsen further 
testified that when a Hispanic gets involved in a fight with a white person, the 
Hispanics all "gang up" and badly injure the white person (R. 1253:195). He testified 
that the Hispanics were "always in groups" and that they usually had weapons 
(R. 1253:203). Olsen also accepted defense counsel's characterization of the group of 
Hispanics who chased defendant following the stabbing as a "gang" (R. 1253:201-02). 
Another defense witness, Mitchell Crane, testified similarly. According to 
Crane, the Hispanics controlled the drug trade, and have "got the run of the park" 
(R. 1253:218). When the Hispanics want to make a "hit" on someone, "one guy will 
whistle and they will come from all over the park to take somebody." Id. Crane also 
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testified that the victim traveled around the park with two or three other people 
(R. 1253:222), and that the Hispanics were known to protect each other (R. 1253:229). 
Crane testified that the Hispanics engage in violence in order to protect their territory 
for drug dealing (R. 1253:232-33), or simply because they are angry at someone 
(R. 1253:234). 
Even one of the state's witnesses, Clifton Jones, testified to the organized, 
violent behavior of the Hispanics in the park. Jones described the Hispanics in the park 
as "clannish," (R. 1252:192) and testified that they operated in groups of three while 
selling drugs (R. 1252:194-95). Jones testified that if someone gets in a fight with one 
Hispanic, he ends up fighting them all: "what we call [it] is gang-banging" 
(R. 1252:197). Jones also described the violent nature of the Hispanic groups in the 
park, testifying as to the types of weapons they carried and their willingness to use 
them (R. 1252:216-18). 
Accordingly, the limited general facts about the Surenos gang contained in the 
speculative affidavit of Chuck Gilbert were more fully and authoritatively testified to by 
several witnesses at trial who had first-hand knowledge of the victim and his Hispanic 
associates at the park. In contrast to Gilbert's general understanding of the behavior of 
a particular street gang (apparently based upon the contents of a pamphlet), the 
testimony regarding the behavior of the Hispanics at the park presented by the trial 
witnesses was far more relevant to the issue at trial: whether defendant reasonably 
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acted in self-defense based upon his understanding of the danger posed by the victim 
and his associates. Whether the victim had, at some point, some unknown level of 
association with a specific street gang, the existence of which was unknown to 
defendant at the time, is of only marginal relevance to this issue. 
Ultimately, the only fact added by the evidence of the tattoo and the Gilbert 
affidavit is that defendant now seeks to put a name, "Surenos," to the Hispanic drug 
dealers that the witnesses all testified operated at the park. The trial court rejected 
defendant's argument that this evidence was significant, finding that the jury's verdict 
was based upon its acceptance of the evidence that the victim "backed up with his 
hands up, open palms" at the time defendant stabbed him (R. 1256:69-70) (Addendum 
B). The addition of a name for the Hispanic group at the park does nothing to 
undermine this fundamental evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that this evidence was not likely to have changed the jury's verdict. 
B. Additional Eyewitness Testimony. 
In further support of his motion for a new trial, defendant cited possible 
testimony from two witnesses alleged to have been at Pioneer Park on the day of the 
stabbing. The trial court was correct in finding that nothing in the proposed testimony 
of these witnesses is significant enough to warrant a new trial. 
Testimony of Julian Valdez. Julian Valdez was in jail during the months 
following defendant's trial, and was interviewed on two separate occasions by 
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investigators from the public defender's office and once by defendant's counsel. See 
Transcripts of Interviews, R.302-361. 
In these interviews, Valdez claimed to have been at the park on the day of the 
stabbing, and described having observed the victim seeking help from various people at 
the park to back him up in a confrontation with defendant. Valdez also claimed that the 
victim asked Valdez to back him up in confronting defendant, but that Valdez refused 
to help him. 
In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court found that there 
was no reasonable probability that Valdez's proffered testimony would result in a 
different verdict, for three reasons: (1) the testimony was cumulative; (2) the testimony 
was not credible; and (3) the testimony also supported the prosecution (R. 1255:89, 
1256:69-70).4 All of these findings are fully supported by the record. 
(1) The court found that the evidence was cumulative. Although Valdez's 
testimony supports defendant's contention that the victim was a violent person who 
intended to fight defendant (R. 1255:88), that testimony is cumulative because other 
evidence in the case had already established that fact, without dispute. "Certainly, 
4
 The trial court made these findings on the record twice. The court first made 
findings when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial at the close of the hearing on 
his motion. R. 1255:85-91 (Addendum A). Defendant later renewed his motion for a 
new trial in connection with his second sentencing hearing, and the court made 
additional findings at that time. R. 1256:67-70 (Addendum B). 
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[Valdez's statement] indicates the victim's propensity towards violence. There's been 
no indication on the record that anybody thinks the victim did not initiate the 
confrontation and the violence." (R. 1256:69). Defendant does not challenge this 
finding. 
(2) The court found that Valdez's statements were of questionable evidentiary 
value. The court found Valdez's statements lacked credibility based upon the fact that 
Valdez's observations at the time were unreliable, as he was very sick and looking for a 
drug fix at that time. Id. In the interviews, Valdez asserted that he was either sick 
because of his addiction to cocaine, or had just taken cocaine and was under the 
influence of the drug at the time of the incidents he described (R.331, 325, 343, 349). 
Indeed, Valdez stated that he was so sick from his need for a fix that he was unable to 
drive his car, and had to take the drug while still at the park (R.349). 
The court's finding that Valdez's statements lacked credibility is also supported 
by significant contradictions in the story Valdez told over the course of the three 
interviews. For example, during the first interview, Valdez explained that he first 
heard about the stabbing when he returned to the park one hour after it happened, and 
that he was not told of the identity of those involved (R.329-30). In this first 
interview, Valdez also claimed that he was not told the identity of the victim or of 
defendant's involvement until months later, and then related in some detail his 
conversation with defendant, where he was surprised to learn that defendant was 
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involved (R.330-31). In the second interview, Valdez stated that he did not find out 
about the stabbing at all until the next day, and gave specific details about being at the 
Salvation Army when he heard about it (R.317-18). In the third interview, Valdez 
changed his story again, this time relating specific details about having been told the 
names of defendant and the victim when he returned to the park on the day of the 
stabbing (R.345). 
There are other inconsistencies. Valdez gives word-for-word descriptions of his 
conversation with the victim that vary widely. At one point, he states that the victim 
wanted "a hand on beating [defendant] up" (R.335). During another interview, he 
claims that the victim told him that he was going to kill defendant (R.343), and yet 
described his surprise at learning that there had been a killing, since he "did not know 
that there was going to be a killing going down" (R.317). At one point in the 
interviews, Valdez states that the victim spoke to him in Spanish (R. 335); later, Valdez 
claims not to have been able to understand the victim because of the victim's poor 
English (R.339-40). In one exchange, Valdez even stated that the victim never spoke 
to him directly, describing how the victim approached and spoke in Spanish to someone 
standing next to him (R.314). Although Valdez asserted at one point that he believed 
the victim intended to kill defendant (R.319), he also asserted several times that he did 
not consider the victim to be dangerous because the victim would never actually follow 
through on a threat or use a weapon (R.311, 332, 341). 
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(3) The court found that Valdez's testimony, if believed, would support the 
State's case. In addition to Valdez's credibility problems, the court found that 
Valdez's statement "cuts two ways" (R. 1256:68-69). In the interviews, Valdez 
repeatedly discounted the possibility that the victim was a serious threat, and disavows 
any implication that the victim was part of an organized group or gang that the victim 
could rely upon. 
Valdez described the victim as having no "heart;" he had seen the victim "throw 
down" a few people, but it was just punches being thrown back and forth, and the 
victim never took a confrontation further than that (R.332). Valdez had confronted the 
victim on a previous occasion, and had slapped him a few times (R.330, 311). Valdez 
stated that although the victim might have been armed, he was not concerned about that 
because "nine times out of ten them guys over there ain't got the heart to pull it out" 
(R.311). 
Valdez's statements also provide a vivid refutation of a basic factual assertion 
relied upon by the defense at trial: that the victim was part of a violent, organized 
group that would target people in the park. Defendant's self defense theory was based 
upon his assertion that he believed the victim was part of a loyal gang of drug dealers 
who acted together in attacking anyone who crossed them. 
To the contrary, Valdez described the victim as going from person to person in 
the park, looking for someone, anyone, to "back him" in confronting defendant 
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(R.335). Indeed, the fact that the victim would seek help from someone like Valdez 
significantly undercuts defendant's assertion that the victim could rely on a loyal 
following in confronting defendant. Valdez was openly hostile to the victim (R.308), 
had slapped the victim around a week or two prior to this incident (R. 309-311), did not 
speak the victim's language well (R.339-40), and was even a good friend of defendant's 
(R.340-41). 
Valdez's statements also constitute a direct refutation of defendant's other "new 
evidence." In contrast to the speculative Gilbert Affidavit regarding the influence of 
gangs at the park and the inference of gang membership that defendant now seeks to 
draw from the victim's tattoos, Valdez asserted that 
[the victim] didn't hang around with certain individuals such as a clique or 
anything he just like they are all there doing their thing trying to compete 
against each other to see which one can sell the dope the fastest. 
(R.342). Valdez's description of the drug trade at Pioneer Park as not being controlled 
by any one group is consistent with the testimony of the state's rebuttal witness, Officer 
Robert Robinson, who testified that no single group controlled the drug trade in the 
park, and that drug dealers operated individually or in small groups of associates 
(R. 1253:262-64). 
Ultimately, Valdez's description of the victim's efforts to recruit backup for his 
confrontation with defendant complements the testimony of the prosecution witnesses 
who saw the stabbing. Although defendant may have been successful in recruiting two 
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people to back him up, Valdez's description implies that these people would not have 
had any personal interest in the confrontation, and would therefore not have 
participated in the victim's initial confrontation. It is also reasonable to conclude, 
based on Valdez's description, that these recruits would not have been eager to put 
themselves in danger by attacking defendant while he was armed. In fact, the trial 
testimony confirms this conclusion; the eyewitnesses testified that the two men who 
accompanied the victim never displayed a weapon and never approached defendant 
(R.1251:263,1253:169). When the victim and defendant confronted each other, these 
men did not make a move to join the fight (R. 1252:189). Even when defendant stabbed 
the victim, these men did not make a move against defendant, and merely went to the 
victim to rifle through his pockets (R. 1252:208). Thus, Valdez's testimony strongly 
supports the State's case by providing an explanation for the passive behavior of the 
victim's "backup:" they had no personal stake in the confrontation. 
Given the apparent value of Valdez's testimony for the prosecution, it is 
questionable whether Valdez would even be called as a witness for the defense if a new 
trial were held. Accordingly, the trial court properly considered the proposed Valdez 
testimony to be of limited value to defendant. See Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 
952 (Utah App. 1998) ("the weight to be given [new] testimony is for the trial judge 
passing on the motion for new trial to determine . . . * A new trial should not be granted 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence unless the evidence is of such materiality 
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that it would be likely to produce a different result upon re-trial/") (quoting State v. 
Norman, 652 P.2d 683, 689 (Kan. 1982)); Foxley v. Foxley, 801 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("For newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial, the evidence must 
have a probative weight sufficient to have a probable effect on the result."). The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the proposed testimony of Julian Valdez 
would not likely change the jury's verdict.5 
Testimony of Gilmar Pinelo. The trial court refused to grant a new trial based 
upon alleged statements of Gilmar Pinelo regarding his participation in the stabbing 
because defendant failed to present any admissible evidence of these statements 
(R. 1255:88). The only evidence offered by defendant with regard to Pinelo is 
defendant's own hearsay description of a conversation with him. Whiteman Affidavit, 
1 6 (R.784-85), Supplemental Affidavit, 11 8-9 (R.1014). On appeal, defendant does 
not dispute the trial court's ruling that defendant's hearsay description of his 
5
 Although the court assumed that the testimony was "new evidence," there is 
some indication that this is not "new" evidence because defendant should have been 
able to discover this testimony prior to trial. In his interview with defendant's counsel, 
Valdez said that defendant told him that defendant remembered seeing Valdez at the 
park on the day of the stabbing (R.347). See State v. Schqffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1186 
(Utah 1981) ("'New evidence' . . . is not evidence newly remembered after trial, or 
evidence available to defendant but not obtained by him prior to the time of trial.") 
(citations omitted). 
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conversation with Pinelo was inadmissible evidence and therefore could not be relied 
upon in support of a motion for a new trial. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 17-18. 
In addition, the only admissible evidence regarding possible testimony by Pinelo 
directly contradicts defendant's assertion of what Pinelo told him. In response to 
defendant's hearsay statements concerning Pinelo, the State offered a transcript of an 
interview with Pinelo in which he disavowed any knowledge of the stabbing, stating 
that he was not in the park at the time (R.912).6 The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the testimony of Gilmar Pinelo would not likely change the 
jury's verdict. 
C. Disposition of Robert Young's DUI charge. 
Defendant argues that new evidence exists that the State offered leniency on a 
DUI charge pending against Robert Young in exchange for his testimony at defendant's 
trial. Brief of Appellant, p. 19. However, defendant has not provided any evidence, 
new or otherwise, of an agreement between Young and the State concerning Young's 
testimony. Indeed, any implication that such a deal was ever made is directly 
contradicted by the evidence. 
6
 The parties stipulated that "the documents and the affidavits and the statements 
would be proffered testimony for the purposes of the hearing [on the motion for a new 
trial.]" (R. 1255:4). Under this stipulation, the interview transcripts of Pinelo and 
Valdez were considered as admissible testimony at the hearing. 
24 
Young was charged with DUI in June, 1993 (R.823). Prior to defendant's trial, 
Young approached the prosecutor and requested leniency in exchange for his testimony. 
The prosecutor refused this request, but offered to call the Salt Lake City prosecutor's 
office arid let them know of Young's cooperation if he appeared and testified at 
defendant's trial (R.878). This request, and the prosecutor's response, was disclosed to 
defendant's counsel prior to trial. Moffat Affidavit, 116 (R.888). Defendant's counsel 
chose not to impeach Young with this information because counsel felt that the jury 
would only have been offended by such an attack on an uninvolved witness. Id. at t 
17. 
A month after the trial, in October 1993, Young entered a no contest plea to the 
DUI and was sentenced by the court to pay a $1,110.00 fine and perform community 
service. There is no evidence that the prosecutor in this case communicated with the 
court in connection with Young's sentencing, and defendant does not argue that the 
disposition of Young's case was in any way unusual. See R.878-89. 
One year later, Young had paid the fine, but there was no record of his having 
completed his required community service hours (R.824). As a result, an additional 
$300.00 was added to Young's fine, and his probation was extended (R.825). In May, 
1995, the court determined that Young's probation period had expired, and the case 
was therefore cleared, even though the additional $300.00 had not been paid. Id. It is 
this (apparently unsolicited) clearing of Young's case without payment of the additional 
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fine, almost two years after defendant's trial, that defendant now characterizes as new 
evidence of a "deal" between Young and the prosecutor. Defendant has not presented 
any evidence that the closing of Young's case was in any way unusual or that the 
prosecutor in defendant's case even had any knowledge of it. 
Accordingly, there is no evidence, new or otherwise, of an agreement for 
leniency in exchange for Young's testimony. The only action taken by the prosecutor 
with regard to Young's testimony was to reject Young's request for leniency, and this 
was known to defendant prior to trial. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT MADE A STRATEGIC DECISION NOT TO 
REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER-INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER, AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ERR BY ACCEPTING THAT DECISION 
Defendant argues that he was entitled to a lesser-included instruction on the 
offense of manslaughter. Brief of Appellant, pp. 23-27. Indeed, the trial court found 
that, if requested, such an instruction would have been given (R. 1255:85). However, 
defendant did not request a manslaughter instruction, and the court did not commit 
error in accepting his strategic choice not to provide the jury with the option of 
convicting him of the lesser crime. 
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A. Defendant did not request a lesser-included instruction. 
Defendant asserts that he formally submitted a requested instruction on the 
lesser-included offense of manslaughter at the conclusion of the trial.n Brief of 
Appellant, p. 26. To the contrary, the trial court found that defendant's counsel 
"specifically waived" the giving of such an instruction (R. 1255:86). Defendant's 
assertion that he requested the instruction is also explicitly contradicted by the record. 
In support of his assertion that he formally requested a lesser-included 
instruction at the conclusion of the trial, defendant cites only to a proposed jury 
instruction submitted to the court prior to trial, an instruction that only directs the jury 
to find defendant guilty of an undescribed lesser-included offense if it finds that there is 
reasonable doubt as to the severity of the crime proven (R. 113). This proposed 
instruction does not describe the elements of the crime of manslaughter, and is so vague 
as to be insufficient, of itself, to instruct the jury with regard to finding a lesser-
included offense in this case. In addition, these instructions submitted by defendant 
before trial were preliminary requests, subject to a later decision as to their 
appropriateness. See R.103 (instruction submitted in anticipation of possibility that 
defendant would decide not testify). 
On the second day of trial, defendant had not yet submitted all of his proposed 
instructions, including his proposed instruction on self-defense. Defendant had also not 
submitted an instruction on imperfect self-defense, which would form the factual basis 
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for a lesser-included manslaughter offense (R. 1252:145). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(3)(a)(ii) (1999) (murder is reduced to manslaughter if defendant has a reasonable 
belief in a legal justification). Defendant's counsel informed the court that defendant 
was still considering whether to request a lesser-included instruction on manslaughter. 
Id. ("Mr. Moffat: We don't know if we are going to ask for manslaughter yet, your 
honor."). 
No such request was ever made. On the morning of the last day of trial, the 
court and counsel met to discuss the instructions, and an agreed-upon set of instructions 
was prepared and given to the parties to examine (R. 1253:128). During this 
conference, the court specifically asked whether defendant wished to request a lesser-
included instruction, and defendant's counsel told the court that he did not. Moffat 
Affidavit, p. 3 (R.888). The court later addressed the parties on the record, and asked 
if there were any objections to the instructions, including any objections to the court's 
refusal to give any requested instructions. In response, defendant's counsel stated that 
he had no objection to the instructions, with the exception of the court's refusal to 
include defendant's proposed instruction on reasonable doubt (R. 1253:129). 
Defendant's failure to object to the jury instructions waives any challenge to the 
instructions on appeal. State v. Perdue 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) 
(" Where no grounds are apparent from the text of the instruction and no objection is 
stated, the objection is presumed waived."); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) ("No party may 
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assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed . . . Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice."). 
Indeed, in this case, the exception to the waiver rule allowing for appellate 
review of the jury instructions "to avoid a manifest injustice" does not apply because 
defendant explicitly rejected the court's invitation to submit a lesser-included 
instruction. "[T]he manifest injustice exception has no application in cases in which the 
defendant invited the very error complained of on appeal." State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT 
App 30, 1 22, 975 P.2d 469 ("This Court will not predicate error upon the failure to 
give an instruction when the party alleging the error failed to offer the instruction.") 
(quoting State v. Swan, 928 P.2d 933, 935 (Mont. 1996)). See also State v. Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995) ("Because defendant failed to object to the 
instruction at trial, we can reach the issue only to avoid manifest injustice. However, 
the manifest injustice exception has no application in cases in which the defendant 
invited the very error complained of on appeal.") (citing State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)) (court refused to consider manifest injustice exception where 
defense counsel stated she had no objection to the instruction). Defendant declined to 
request a lesser-included instruction on manslaughter, and cannot now complain that the 
trial court accepted his strategic decision. 
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Defendant argues that his failure to request a lesser-included instruction should 
not constitute a waiver of his right to have such an instruction given because "the 
waiver by Defendant must be made distinctly and on the record." Brief of Appellant, 
p. 28. Defendant fails to cite any authority in support of this proposition. Indeed, 
defendant's contention is contradicted by Rule 19(c) and the case law cited above 
explicitly holding that defendant's failure to propose a jury instruction constitutes a 
waiver of it. Kiriluk, at] 22. A trial court obviously cannot be expected to obtain an 
explicit, personal, on-the-record waiver from a defendant as to every possible jury 
instruction that the defendant could, but did not, request. 
B. The trial court did not err in accepting defendant's decision not to 
give a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. 
Even if the trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense at 
defendant's request is reviewable, the court did not commit error. Defendant asserts 
that the trial court erred because "language from our courts and others suggests that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction, whether requested or not, 
so long as the evidence provides a rational basis for such an instruction." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 29. Defendant here argues that, even in the face of a defendant's 
decision not to ask for a lesser-included instruction, the trial court must ignore that 
decision and include the instruction anyway. 
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This argument was explicitly rejected long ago. In State v. Mitchell, 278 P.2d 
618, 621 (Utah 1955), the court held that a defendant has a choice whether to seek a 
lesser-included instruction, and the court has no independent duty to give the instruction 
if not requested. 
A highly skilled advocate, conscientiously and deliberately believing it to 
be of benefit to his client, may not request and may even resist, 
instructions on intermediate offenses, or may request an instruction 
precluding instructions on lesser offenses . . . being convinced that the 
state has not proved the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
not wishing to subject his client to the possibility of conviction of some 
other offense. Besides, it would seem palpably unreasonable to allow one 
to sit by and deliberately refuse to request instructions as to lesser 
offenses, with positive assurance of another trial if his client be convicted 
of the charge against him. The great weight of authority is to the effect 
that if no request is made for instructions on lesser offenses, and none is 
given, such failure to instruct is not reviewable as a matter of right on 
appeal. We subscribe to such view. 
Id. at 621-22. Since Mitchell, Utah cases have consistently recognized that it is a 
defendant's choice, as a matter of trial strategy, to either request or refuse a lesser-
included instruction. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982) ("on occasion, 
an accused may choose not to request instructions on lesser included offenses as a 
matter of trial strategy, usually in the belief that he can defeat the greater charge, but 
might not be able to defeat a lesser included offense."); State v. Valdez, %52 P.2d 53, 
54 (Utah 1967) ("Sometimes as a matter of trial strategy a defendant desires to have his 
case submitted to the jury upon the basis of the greater offense only and to risk 'all or 
nothing' on the outcome."). 
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The trial court did not err in accepting defendant's strategic decision not to give 
the jury the option of convicting him of a lesser offense. "Having made his choice, he 
is bound by it; and he cannot thus elect to make no request as to a lesser included 
offense, with a reservation in mind that if he is convicted he can claim error and obtain 
a new trial." Valdez, 432 P.2d at 54. 
C. The decision not to request a lesser-included instruction was a 
reasonable strategic choice. 
Defendant nevertheless seeks review of this claim by asserting that the decision 
not to request a lesser-included instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 34. Defendant assumes, without discussion, that if a lesser-
included instruction is an option, it should always be requested. This argument ignores 
. the fact that rejecting a lesser-included instruction is a well-recognized and reasonable 
trial strategy. The trial court found that this strategy was reasonable in this case: 
As to the lack of proper jury instructions, I'm going to find that 
that was appropriate trial tactics, and a reasonable gamble. If the 
attorneys in [consultation] with their client thought they were going to 
win, if the jury believed Mr. Whiteman's version, they could have 
acquitted him of all charges. 
Asking for a lesser-included instruction would be fatal or lessen the 
chance of an acquittal across the board. 
R. 1256:69. The court's finding that this was a reasonable decision, made in 
consultation with defendant himself, is supported by the testimony of defendant's trial 
counsel. "At the conclusion of the evidence we talked with Defendant about asking for 
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a lesser included offense. Defendant thought we were winning and he did not want a 
lesser included instruction." Moffat Affidavit, 118 (R.888).7 
In considering a claim that counsel was deficient, this Court "will give trial 
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions 
unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 
644 (Utah 1996) (citing Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)); State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) ("we must be persuaded that there was a 
'lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions'") (quoting State v. 
Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). As stated, the decision not to 
request a lesser-included instruction is recognized as a reasonable strategic choice, and 
defendant has not provided any basis for questioning it in this case. See State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (failure to request lesser-included was proper 
trial strategy). 
7
 Although defendant responded to Moffat's testimony with a supplemental 
affidavit denying that he discussed the issue with counsel (R.1013), this assertion is not 
credible and was impliedly rejected by the trial court (R. 1256:69). Defendant was 
present in court when his counsel informed the court that they were still considering 
whether to request a lesser-included instruction (R. 1252:145). Further, Moffat's 
affidavit shows that the decision whether to request a lesser-included instruction was 
carefully considered, and defendant has failed to show that his counsel for some reason 
kept this decision a secret from him. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his 
attorney's alleged failure to (1) fully investigate his case, (2) request a lesser-included 
instruction, (3) present medical evidence of defendant's mental condition, and (4) 
adequately cross-examine certain witnesses. Brief of Appellant, p. 31. To prevail on 
this claim, defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient, and that there exists a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, 
he would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 
638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
In denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial court rejected defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that defendant's attorneys acted 
reasonably in investigating and presenting the defense (R. 1255:87). "[W]hen a trial 
court has heard a motion for a new trial based on an ineffective assistance claim, an 
appellate court will not set aside the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.n 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990). The record fully supports the trial 
judge's finding that defendant's counsel acted reasonably. 
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A. No evidence of a failure to investigate exists. 
To show that counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct a reasonable 
investigation, "defendant must show not only that counsel failed to seek mitigating 
evidence, but also that some actually existed to be found." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 
681, 687 (Utah 1997). Further, trial counsel's decisions regarding the investigation of 
the case should be reviewed with "a heavy measure of deference to counsel's 
judgments." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant argues that his attorneys did not conduct an adequate investigation 
because they failed to discover and present evidence of the victim's gang affiliation. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 32-33. In rejecting this argument, the trial court found that 
"counsel pursued diligently the leads that were presented and the resources that were 
available to expend" (R. 1255:887). This finding is fully supported by the record. 
At the time of trial, no one was aware of the victim's gang affiliation or of the 
significance of the victim's tattoos. Defendant does not provide any evidence that 
anyone was aware of the existence of the Surenos prior to the trial, and defendant 
himself was unaware of it, even though he acknowledges that he spent a great deal of 
time at the park. Defendant did not give his attorneys any information that would have 
reasonably led them to investigate gang membership. See Moffat Affidavit, t 9 
(R.887) ("Mr. Whiteman did not ask us to investigate the victim's gang affiliation nor 
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to investigate street gang activities at the park. . . . Defendant did not tell us anything 
about the Surenos gang or that he thought the victim was a member of that gang."). 
In considering whether defense counsel has conducted a reasonable investigation, 
counsel's actions must be considered in light of the information provided by defendant. 
"[T]he reasonableness of investigative decisions critically depends on information the 
defendant supplies." Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 286 n.6 (Utah 1995) {citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)). None of the witnesses, 
including police officers who patrolled the park and others who spent a great deal of 
time at the park, were apparently aware of the alleged existence or influence of the 
Surenos gang. Defendant has therefore failed to provide any basis for finding that 
defendant's attorneys should have discovered it. "Counsel's actions are usually based, 
quite properly, on . . . information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what 
investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.8 
Defendant also asserts that his attorneys failed to follow up on witness statements 
obtained from the prosecutor. Brief of Appellant, p. 33. The record refutes this claim. 
8
 In any event, defendant's trial counsel presented at trial significant evidence of 
the victim's gang association as one of the Hispanic drug dealers in the park, and 
additional gang evidence would have been cumulative. See discussion of the gang 
evidence, supra at pp. 13-16. 
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First, defendant has not provided any evidence that his attorneys failed to follow 
up on some reasonable investigative lead. The only evidence of possible additional 
testimony cited by defendant is the witness interview transcripts, in which several 
witnesses generally describe what happened after the stabbing when defendant ran from 
the park. Defendant's counsel obtained copies of all these reports, and followed up on 
them. 
We received the police reports and copies of the transcripts of the 
interviews with certain of the State's witnesses including Bernard Townes 
and Charles Drake. We read the reports and the transcripts and listened 
to the tape records of these and other witnesses. 
We asked our investigator to find and interview many witnesses. 
Some of these witnesses were transient and were difficult to locate. We 
were not able to locate Bernard Townes although we sent our investigator 
to find Townes. 
We also interviewed many witnesses and went to the Pioneer Park 
ourselves several times investigating the case. 
We reviewed the statement of Charles Drake and decided not to 
use valuable investigative time interviewing him because he did not see 
the stabbing and he only saw the aftermath which were observed by other 
more credible witnesses. 
Moffat Affidavit, 114-6, 8 (R.886-87). Defendant has submitted no evidence that 
would call into question whether his trial counsel made a reasonable effort to 
investigate this case. See State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991) 
("Nothing in the record establishes that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate 
pre-trial investigation."). Indeed, even if defendant had shown that there was a 
possible witness that counsel failed to interview, that alone would not imply that 
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counsel was ineffective. State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah App. 1993) 
("While there may be some remote possibility that such individuals saw the events, 
could be located, and would have a different view of what happened than the 
eyewitnesses who testified at trial, it is not reasonable to expect trial counsel to try to 
locate every possible witness who might have observed the incident, especially from 
some distance, in the hope that one of them might provide helpful testimony."). In 
short, defendant's attorneys investigated and evaluated the testimony of the available 
witnesses before trial, and defendant provides no basis for questioning their judgment.9 
See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) ("If counsel believes that 
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or harmful, we will not question that 
decision in the absence of a showing that counsel's belief was unreasonable. To do so 
would be to second-guess counsel's trial strategy."). 
Finally, defendant has failed to show that additional investigation by his 
attorneys would have yielded significant evidence in his favor. Defendant refers to 
9
 Defendant also argues that his attorneys should have discovered and presented 
the testimony of Gilmar Pinelo and Julian Valdez. Brief of Appellant, p.33. However, 
defendant does not explain why his attorneys should have been able to discover these 
witnesses before trial when they were not mentioned in any reports, and defendant does 
not claim to have given his attorneys any information about them. Defendant also 
claims that his attorneys failed to discover that Robert Young was given a lighter 
sentence in exchange for his testimony. Id. at p. 34. As explained above, supra at pp. 
24-26, there is no evidence of such an exchange, and defendant does not claim that this 
deal took place until almost two years after the trial. 
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several possible witnesses mentioned in the police reports, including William Shultz, 
Charles Drake, and Bernard Townes, but does not provide evidence of what their 
testimony would be or argue why that testimony would have changed the result of the 
trial. "[A] defendant 'cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test simply by 
identifying unexplored avenues of investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that further investigation would have yielded sufficient 
information to alter the outcome of his trial.'" State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 265 (Utah 
App. 1995) (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523-24 (Utah 1994)). See also 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant's claim of inadequate 
investigation fails because defendant failed to show what evidence would have been 
obtained upon further investigation). 
B. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to present evidence of 
defendant's alleged mental deficiencies. 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to prove that 
defendant suffered from mental and emotional "deficiencies." Brief of Appellant, p. 
34. Defendant asserts that he suffered from "bi-polar disorders," and that proof of this 
condition would have helped his case "by showing that he did not have the necessary 
intent for homicide." Id. However, defendant has not provided any evidence to 
support this argument, either to show that he actually had some medical or 
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psychological condition that would have formed the basis for a viable defense, or to 
show that his attorneys should have known of this condition. 
In making this argument, defendant relies upon an evaluation letter to a disability 
claims examiner from a psychologist reporting on some testing results. Although 
certain diagnoses are listed, there is nothing in this document to support a finding that 
this information has any relevance to defendant's state of mind at the time of the 
stabbing, let alone that his mental condition would have formed the basis for an 
acquittal. As noted above, when arguing that counsel was ineffective for failure to 
investigate, defendant has the burden to show not only that there was some avenue of 
investigation that counsel failed to explore, but also that the additional investigation 
would have provided significant evidence likely to have resulted in an acquittal. Price, 
909 P.2d at 265. The evaluation letter now provided by defendant does not meet this 
burden; it is not admissible evidence, and the diagnostic terms it mentions do not 
themselves provide any support for a finding that defendant lacked the mental state 
required for the offense. 
In any event, defendant has failed to show that his attorneys acted improperly. 
Defendant's counsel asserted that he did not recall having seen the report or discussing 
it with defendant. Moffat Affidavit, 113 (R.888). Further, defendant's counsel stated 
that even if he had been aware of the report, it would not have affected the presentation 
of defendant's case, because "[t]he contents of Dr. Grant's report are inconsistent with 
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our theory of self-defense." Id. At trial, defense counsel attempted to portray 
defendant as having acted reasonably under a serious threat of harm. This was a 
reasonable defense strategy, which would not have been aided by evidence that 
defendant was mentally unstable in some (still unknown) way. Defendant has not 
presented any evidence or argument that a defense based upon a mental deficiency 
would have been the only reasonable strategic choice.10 
C. Defendant has failed to point out any deficiencies in his counsel's 
cross examination of prosecution witnesses. 
Defendant asserts that his attorneys failed to adequately cross examine 
prosecution witnesses. Brief of Appellant, p. 35. In support of this argument, 
defendant points to alleged deficiencies in cross-examining two witnesses, but fails to 
support his assertion with evidence of specific inconsistencies in the testimony of these 
witnesses. 
Defendant argues that the cross-examination of Elizabeth Woods was deficient 
because counsel failed to point out an alleged inconsistency with Woods' preliminary 
hearing testimony. Defendant asserts that he remembers Woods testifying at the 
preliminary hearing that she saw defendant push the victim back with both hands on the 
shoulders during their confrontation (R.786). However, in making this argument, 
10
 Defendant also asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce this 
evidence of mental deficiencies at sentencing. Brief of Appellant, p. 37. However, 
this evidence was, in fact, introduced in evidence and argued at defendant's second 
sentencing hearing (R. 1256:8-9). 
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defendant does not provide evidence of what Woods' preliminary hearing testimony 
was, and does not cite to any trial testimony which would be inconsistent even with 
defendant's memory of what Woods testified to at the preliminary hearing. 
In addition, even if defendant had made a showing that Woods' trial testimony 
omitted the incident that defendant now recalls from her preliminary hearing testimony, 
there is no reason to believe that cross-examination on this point would have turned to 
defendant's advantage, let alone that such would have had a likely effect on the verdict. 
Assuming that defendant's memory of the preliminary hearing testimony is correct, and 
Woods testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant had pushed the victim during 
their confrontation, it would be poor defense strategy to remind the witness of this 
testimony at trial, thereby prompting the witness to describe additional aggressive 
behavior by defendant against the victim. See Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 876 ("The 
decision of whether to pursue a certain line of questioning is entrusted to the judgment 
of counsel.") 
The only other allegation defendant makes regarding his attorneys' failure to 
cross examine witnesses is that uMr. Young had apparently made previous statements 
to the police and his inconsistencies were not presented at trial." Brief of Appellant, p. 
35. Defendant fails to cite to the record to show that any such prior statements exist, 
let alone that these alleged statements were in some significant way inconsistent with 
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Young's trial testimony. As in Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 876, "[defendant] has not 
demonstrated what a more extensive cross-examination would have uncovered.n 
D. Defendant was not denied a fair trial. 
Acknowledging his inability to meet the requirements of Strickland for making a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant argues that this court should 
simply ignore the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test in this case, and cites 
to State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533 (Utah App. 1997). Brief of Appellant, p. 38. 
However, the Classon court did not require a strict showing of actual prejudice because 
in that case, the defendant was essentially denied any representation at all. 935 P.2d at 
533 ("a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel when, as in this case, a 
lawyer is requested, but no lawyer accepts actual responsibility for preparation and 
defense of the case.") {citing Kryger v. Turner, 479 P.2d 477, 480 (Utah 1971) ("The 
right of an accused to have counsel is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an 
appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests no real concern about the 
interests of the accused."). Defendant has not made any such argument in this case, 
and cannot do so, as his representation at trial by two attorneys, Mark Moffat and 
Richard Mauro, could in no way be described as a "sham or pretense.w 
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POINT IV 
THE STATE DID NOT FAIL TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to due process by not 
disclosing evidence that might have been exculpatory. Brief of Appellant, p. 39. To 
prevail on this claim, defendant must show that the prosecutor failed to disclose 
evidence favorable to the defense, and that this undisclosed evidence is "constitutionally 
material," i.e., that there is "a 'reasonable probability' that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed." State v. Bakalov, 1999 
UT 45, 1 39, 979 P.2d 799 {quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985)). 
Defendant's argument on this issue fails because he has not identified any 
evidence of any kind, whether "constitutionally material" or not, that the prosecutor 
failed to disclose prior to trial. The record reflects that the prosecutor provided 
defendant with access to every witness statement and report in the case (R.51-55). 
Indeed, defendant's trial counsel acknowledged that he examined the witness statements 
produced in connection with this case, along with the reports produced concerning the 
examination of the victim's body. Moffat Affidavit, 114, 12 (R.886-87). Defendant 
does not point to a single fact or bit of evidence, whether in the prosecutor's file or in 
his mind, that was not disclosed before trial. 
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Instead of identifying facts that the prosecutor failed to disclose, defendant cites 
only to facts that were not known to anyone before trial, and even to speculative facts 
that are still unknown. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly withheld the 
following items: 
(1) evidence of the victim's association with the Surenos gang as shown 
by his tattoos; 
(2) the name and statement of Gilmar Pinelo; 
(3) other statements from eyewitnesses such as William Schultz, Bernard 
Townes, and Charles Drake; and 
(4) Robert Young's DUI charge and favorable treatment in exchange for 
his testimony. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 40-41. The only actual evidence in this list is the testimony later 
. submitted by defendant that makes a connection between the victim's "SUR" tattoo and 
the Surenos gang. Defendant does not allege that this connection was known by the 
prosecution before trial, and nothing in the record implies that anyone was aware of the 
Surenos gang at the time of trial. 
As for the witnesses cited (Pinelo, Schultz, Townes, and Drake), defendant does 
not point out any evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose a statement or report. 
Defendant does not allege that the prosecutor knew the identity of Pinelo, and the 
record does not even support defendant's assertion that Pinelo had any relevant 
testimony to offer. Further, defendant does not cite to any alleged statements of 
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Schultz, Townes or Drake, and, as noted, his trial counsel acknowledged that the 
prosecutor provided access to all witness statements. Moffat Affidavit, 14 (R.886). 
Finally, as to Robert Young's DUI charge, there is no dispute that the prosecutor 
disclosed to defendant the fact that Young had requested leniency in exchange for his 
testimony, and that the prosecutor had denied this request. Moffat Affidavit, 5 16 
(R.888). Also, there is no evidence that any "deal" was ever made with Young with 
regard to his testimony. See supra, pp. 24-26. 
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that his right to due process was 
denied. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE HE FAILS TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING HIS CONVICTION 
Defendant asserts that his conviction is not supported by the evidence, 
questioning how the jury could have convicted him in light of the evidence he presented 
in support of his self-defense theory. However, in making his argument that the 
evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to convict, defendant fails to meet his 
burden to marshal the evidence. 
"The burden is heavy on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Defendant 'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then 
demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient 
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to support the verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 Utah App. 305 125, 989 P.2d 503 
(citation omitted) {quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). 
Reversal occurs "only when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable 
that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." Strain, 885 P.2d at 819 {quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 
540, 543 (Utah 1994) (additional quotations omitted)). See also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding."). 
In this case, defendant has wholly failed to marshal the evidence supporting his 
conviction. Instead of listing, "in comprehensive and fastidious order," the evidence 
presented by the State in support of his conviction, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), defendant recites only his version of 
selected evidence allegedly supporting his theory of self defense. Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 43-45. 
The evidence supporting defendant's conviction includes the fact that he 
retrieved his knife on the morning of the stabbing in order to take care of a "problem" 
(R. 1251:179), and that defendant was aggressive in dealing with the victim in their 
confrontations, shouting and exchanging threats with him (R. 1252:160, 165, 168-69). 
The evidence also showed that defendant stood up and approached the victim with his 
fists raised to engage in mutual combat (R. 1251:224, 1253:174), and that the victim 
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was alone and unarmed at the time of their confrontation (R. 1251:263). Most 
significantly, the evidence showed that when defendant came up with his knife after 
being hit by the victim, the victim backed away with his empty hands raised, and 
defendant took several steps forward to stab him in the chest (R. 1251:216, 226). The 
jury obviously accepted this evidence that, at the time he stabbed the victim, defendant 
was either not in imminent danger of serious injury or death, and/or that he was 
engaged in mutual combat. See Jury Instruction Nos. 22, 24 (R.199, 201) (instructions 
on self defense and mutual combat). 
Defendant has not met his burden to marshal the evidence. "He merely recites 
his own version of the facts, and presents none of the evidence supporting the 
convictions." Shepherd, 1999 Utah App. 305 at 5 25. This Court should not consider 
his insufficiency claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ] 3 day of March, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
H WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen, I want to note for the 
2 record, I think that the effort you have done on 
3 Mr. Whiteman1s behalf is extraordinary in terms of being able 
4 to pull a lot of different things together and to assist 
5 Mr. Whiteman in presenting the issues. I know Mr. Whiteman 
6 has struggled for many months now trying to put in the legal 
7 format his concerns and pull these things up. And I 
8 appreciate the amount of time you have spent doing that as 
9 well as the quality of the work that you have done. 
10 Let me state for the record as well that I feel a 
11 little bit handicapped ruling on post trial motions for a 
12 trial that I didn't conduct. And so that, I think, may limit 
13 some of what ordinarily is fairly broad discretion that a 
14 trial judge has in terms of granting post trial motions. 
15 Let me work through the six items that have been 
16 raised. With the inadequate or the imperfect self-defense 
17 instruction, I am going to find that that instruction was 
18 appropriately given and it was not an error to giving the 
19 instruction that Judge Murphy did. 
20 With the lesser-included instruction, I am going 
21 to find that if Mr. Whiteman had asked for that instruction, 
22 he certainly would have been entitled to that. I think his 
23 testimony alone would have been sufficient to provide an 
24 evidentiary basis for the giving of such an instruction. But 
25 that it is not plain error to not give that instruction, 
11 r e q u e s t i t J >i 11 '.Il i : 1.1i i Il  "i i1 IIIi(J11) i I ( "i 
2 specifically waived by attorneys on the record when they are 
3 asked to review the instructions and they had exceptions to 
4 t believe the state of 
5 the law is such that the Court can give a lesser-included 
I defendant and certainly 
7 not when they waive the instruction and the prosecutor is not 
II asking instruct 
9 In terms of number three, the ineffective 
10 assistance of counsel, given the last two or three years, the 
11 ineffective assistance of counsel, I think if you look at the 
10
 situation that we see *- the community at large, not just the 
issue • I th ii n l :: there endency of the community to 
view ineffective assistance of counsel as anything less than 
Mr. Simpson clearly had enough money that they spent enormous 
i 
defendant. 
And
 r e G O g n £ 2 e that that places then 
20 defendants without sufficient means at a disadvantage when 
compared to somebody who has unlimited resources. But I 
22 don't believe the state of the law requires that all avenues 
23 be exhausted, but instead that the reasonable information 
11 ll'iiiifiirl i"! presented In I .'iI,lowed iif : i xp - :: n, • tha I: M .1 tnesses II) 
25 interviewed, that the logical conclusions of what people say 
1 are weighed in terms of a trial strategy. 
2 I think the record demonstrates that counsel did 
3 meet the objective standard of reasonableness. That there 
4 was a coherent trial strategy centered around a theory of 
5 self-defense. A great deal of effort and time was spent 
6 presenting to the jury that Pioneer Park was not a safe 
7 environment. That there are dangers inherent in the drug 
8 activity and the people and the groups that frequented the 
9 park, that there was a higher incidence of violence. That 
10 people weren't safe. 
11 There is certainly available hindsight that the 
12 information about gangs, in light of what we know now, might 
13 have been presented a little differently — surely the 
14 information about the tatoo, the Surenos identification with 
15 the gangs. But I am going to find that counsel pursued 
16 diligently the leads that were presented and the resources 
17 that were available to expend. 
18 The fourth avenue, the mitigation evidence, the 
19 exculpatory evidence, the Surenos tatoo and so forth, if 
20 there were evidence that the prosecutor or the investigator 
21 in the case knew the Surenos tatoo and did not disclose that 
22 and withheld that, knew that the tatoo was a label worn by 
23 gang members and did not disclose that, I think that would 
24 have been a violation of the exculpatory evidence that's 
25 required. But I don't think that the law requires that what 
any individual officer knew is attributable to what the 
'" proseci earn knew without some 
3 showing of collusion or something else. " think the 
4 prosecution team be charged «*iedge that they 
5 had reasonably before them and not what somebody else in the 
6 gang unit or somebody else may have knot 
^ find that the exculpatory evidence was not improperly 
8 withheld from the defense team. 
9 The most troubling p^rt of the motions that have 
been presented though in my mind is the new evidence. 
testimony but that gives me less 
12 concern. Mr. Whiteman has made representations about what 
knew • But Il • > t "il i , 11 ,• i» j > r e s *«• •»< I 11 ! " ' • y 
14 indication that Pinelo is willing or has in the past 
15 presented evidence that would I, "i admissM'i" •• " ' ,| l ' Il * ' k 
16 about his role in striking Mr. Whiteman with a fence post n 
17 in backing up Mr. Lopezf or Mi • Gomez. And I.HMIMI 1 .u»e 
18 clear indication of admissible Evidence, that's not something 
19 that I am willing to grant a new trial on. 
20 With Mr. Valdez's testimonyf his statement about 
21 the recruitment, about the threat in the park# about 
22 Mi i II i f r lull I'll iii il 1 r i i I threat, those things can certainly 
23 weigh both ways. It would certainly support Mr. Whitemanfs 
24 contention that to do serious 
25 bodily harm to Mr. Whiteman. 
1 On the down sider Mr. Valdez's credibility 
2 certainly can be questioned by the terms of the interviews. 
3 He was sick, looking for a fix to get better. And while I 
4 would have admitted the evidence at trial if I had been the 
5 trial judge and Mr. Valdez were available to testify, I have 
6 to find that I don't believe Mr. Valdez's testimony rises to 
7 the level that would properly result in a different verdict. 
8 It certainly might, but I don't think the law allows me to 
9 set aside a jury verdict on a "mightM and grant a new trial, 
10 but it requires instead that there would probably be a 
11 different result. So I am going to deny the motion for a new 
12 trial based upon any new evidence. 
13 Not for purposes of argument but to clarify things 
14 for appeal and to make sure all the avenues are available, is 
15 there anything that anybody wants to place on the record? 
16 MR. PARKER: Not from the State, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen? 
18 MR. NIELSEN: If the Court will allow me just a 
19 moment, please. 
20 THE COURT: Sure. 
21 MR. NIELSEN: I assume that your Honor's ruling 
22 with regard to Mr. Valdez's testimony will apparently be the 
23 same with regard to the evidence, newly discovered evidence 
24 regarding the significance of the tatoos. 
25 THE COURT: That's right. That it's certainly a 
1 dangerous place down there. There are dangerous people and 
2 violent people there. But it was not information 
3 specifically that Mr. Whiteman had at the time of the 
4 confrontation. And as such, it is not relevant to his mental 
5 state at the time he was defending himself, and as such would 
6 not rise to the level of a probable different result. 
7 MR. NIELSEN: I wanted to make clear with the 
8 Court. Is the Court saying that with regard to this 
9 testimony, that it doesn't rise to the level of the 
10 reasonable probability, which is the last element, or is your 
11 Honor making some other determination with regard to this 
12 evidence? 
13 THE COURT: No. Just that it would not result in a 
14 probably different verdict. 
15 MR. NIELSEN: Thank you, your Honor. I have 
16 nothing further. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Whiteman, anything that you want to 
18 put on the record? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: No. Thank you very much for your 
20 time, your Honor. And I do appreciate the opportunity to 
21 present this today. Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Separate from that then is your 
23 motion to reconsider on the sentencing. I am going to deny 
24 that for a separate reason, and let me state that on the 
25 record as well. 
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1 I think it would be inappropriate for me to 
2 sentence differently than the judge who presided at the trial 
3 and heard the evidence• I certainly recognize that trial 
4 judges have discretion. But I think, given the fact that I 
5 did not hear the evidence, it would be inappropriate for me 
6 to impose a sentence different than the judge who did conduct 
7 the trial. 
8 So that's a separate ground for why I haven't 
9 granted the resentencing. And you may want to present that 
10 as well. 
11 Thank you, counsel. 
12 MR. PARKER: Thank you, your Honor. 
13 MR. NIELSEN: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Court will be in recess. 
15 MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, may I have a few minutes 
16 with Mr. Whiteman here in the courtroom? 
17 THE COURT: Five minutes is fine. We don't start 
18 until 2. If you need longer than that, Mr. Nielsen, I will 
19 give you a chance to talk in the jury room or something. I 
20 would certainly like to give you a chance to talk with him so 
21 you can plan your next steps. 
22 (This concludes these proceedings at 1:50 p.m.) 
23 * * * 
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exception, though, they were concerned about the 
reasonable doubt and wanted to challenge that one. 
But they passed all the jury instructions that are 
here at issue. 
This simply is not a case of whether such 
things would or would not have made a difference. 
The real issue is were those things that defense 
counsel did proper preparation and were they 
legitimate trial tactics? And they were. They 
were good decisions that were made after careful 
thought and investigation. And there is no 
grounds to go back and revisit this on what 
counsel did or did not do. 
Again, I'll submit this, your Honor. I think 
the sentence is appropriate of five to life. 
THE COURT: I'm going to note for the record 
that the SUR tattoo from victim's arm, I suspect, 
probably is -- in fact, I know Mr. Parker is 
unwilling to concede that, but I believe the 
information would certainly bear out the fact that 
that is, in fact, a gang-affiliated tattoo for 
Surenos, which is a notorious gang. It's not a 
little offshoot. It's notoriety exceeds the area 
of Pioneer Park. 
But I certainly think it may be reasonable 
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that that information was not 
was not available at the time 
question is, would that tattoo 
make a difference? 
In review of the record, 
presented with the information 
this case was a bad guy, had b 
genuinely known and 
of the trial. The 
have been enough to 
and the jury was 
that the victim in 
een involved in 
perpetrating violence, they were presented with 
evidence of a number of crimes that happened in 
Pioneer Park, of the environment that the police 
were not the refuge of safety 
lived there. 
for the people who 
That given the information that they were 
presented with about the victi m and his propensity 
towards violence, given the environment that was 
explained to the jurors about Pioneer Park, I'm 
not convinced that identification which occurred 
afterwards was not reasonably available at the 
time of trial. But even if that information had 
been available at the trial, I 
would have made a difference. 
But the affidavits of Mr. 
other person who indicated the 
by the victim to get Whiteman, 
cuts two ways. Certainly, it 
•m not sure that 
Valdez and the 
y had been recruited 
that information 
indicates the 
victim's propensity towards violence. There's 
been no indication on the record that anybody 
thinks the victim did not initiate the 
confrontation and the violence. 
But the attempt to recruit people cuts two 
ways. It demonstrates that there was not an 
organized system of enforcement where the victim 
had automatic help. He had to go out and find 
some. Although it does show that the victim was 
coming after Whlteman, I don't think the evidence 
ever disputed the fact that the victim initiated 
the violence. 
As to the lack of proper jury instructions, 
I'm going to find that that was appropriate trial 
tactics, and a reasonable gamble. If the 
attorneys in concentration with their client 
thought they were going to win, if the jury 
believed Mr. Whiteman's version, they could have 
acquitted him of all the charges. 
Asking for a lesser-included instruction 
would be fatal or lessen the chance of an 
acquittal across the board. I'm going to find 
that the new evidence is insufficient to get 
around the problem that Mr. Young creates for the 
defense• 
If there's a witness, the jury sat and judged 
his credibility when he said that the victim 
backed up with his hands up, open palms, that if 
the jury found him a credible witness, the rest of 
the information, whether or not the victim was a 
gang member, whether or not others were backing 
him up, is sufficient to support the jury verdict* 
I'm going to deny the request to lower the 
sentencing by one charge by one degree. I'm going 
to impose a sentence of five to life on the first 
degree murder charge. 
I'll note for the record, and to the extent 
that it's Mr. Nielsen and his client think it may 
be helpful, I would certainly be willing to sign a 
recommendation indicating that over the last few 
years I've found Mr. Whiteman to be a different 
person than the one who appears to have testified 
on his own behalf at the trial. 
It's been my experience that Mr. Whiteman is 
calmer, rational, and appropriate, thoughtful, 
certainly vigorous in his defense, but does not 
appear to be the same person, the same personality 
who was involved in the incident. 
And to the extent that that may be helpful to 
the board in setting the appropriate review dates, 
71 
I'd certainly make that recommendation, 
Mr. Nielsen, if you think that's helpful 
MR. NIELSEN: Thank you. 
MR. WHITEMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else that we need to do 
to make sure the record is complete? 
When 
from 
said 
with 
that 
MR. PARKER: Not from the State. 
MR. WHITEMAN: You know what, your Honor. 
you said that his hands went up or something 
Robert Earl Young. He, in that testimony, 
that he had never seen anything that fast 
stabbing. And what I had testified to was 
it was physics. When I came up, because he 
was getting ready to hit me again, that's when his 
hands came up and he went down. He wasn't backing 
up to anything. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, I appreciate the 
Court's indulgence and the Court's time and the 
time that has allowed counsel to present this 
problem to the Court. And also to allow 
Mr. Whiteman to express himself. 
THE COURT: Well, I think it's inherent on 
the system that people be allowed their day in 
Court or their days, if that's necessary, to make 
sure things are presented. The system ought not 
run in a fashion where somebody's given the short 
drift and pushed off to the side. But they ought 
to have a chance to stand up and be listened to. 
MR. NIELSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. WHITEMAN: Thank you, your Honor. I 
appreciate the recommendation to the board. 
MR. NIELSEN: And if the Court please, may I 
have just a few minutes with Mr. whiteman either 
outside or wherever? 
THE COURT: Sure. Court will be adjourned. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MICHAEL WHITEMAN, 
Defendant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK MOFFAT 
CaseNo.931900809FS 
Hon. William A. Thorne, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mark Moffat, being first duly sworn on oath, states and affirms: 
1. I am an attorney employed as an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc. 
2. In 1993, Rich Mauro and myself were appointed to represent Michael Whiteman 
in case number 931900809FS wherein he was charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder. 
3. Prior to trial, Mr. Mauro and myself conducted an extensive investigation into the 
case. 
4. We received the police reports and copies of the transcripts of the interviews with 
certain of the State's witnesses including Bernard Townes and Charles Drake. We read the 
reoorts and the transcriots and listened to the taoe records of these and other witness. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK MOFFAT 
Case No. 93I900809FS 
Page No. 2 
5. We asked our investigator to find and interview many witnesses. Some of these 
witnesses were transient and were difficult to locate. We were not able to locate Bernard Townes 
although we sent our investigator to find Townes. 
6. We also interviewed many witnesses and went to the Pioneer Park ourselves 
several times investigating the case. 
7. We went to the location where Elizabeth Woods was when she saw what she later 
thought was the stabbing. We took photographs in the same lighting conditions and from the 
position she was at and from the location of the stabbing. 
8. We reviewed the statement of Charles Drake and decided not to use valuable 
investigative time interviewing him because he did not see the stabbing and he only saw the 
aftermath which were observed by other more credible witnesses. 
9. Mr. Whiteman did not askee us to investigate the victim's gang affiliation nor to 
investigate gang activities at the park. He did state that Mexican nationals were the group that 
worked together and were the ones that he feared would attack him. We talked to witnesses, 
other attorneys in our office, and even other clients about the organization at the park. All of 
those persons told us that the Mexican nationals were the ones running the distribution of drugs 
at the park. Defendant did not tell us anything about the Surenos gang or that he thought the 
victim was a member of that gang. 
10. We conducted extensive investigation into the violence at the park and presented 
evidence at the trial that the park was an extremely violent place. 
11. We also knew of the victim's violent nature and presented that information at the 
trial. We also knew of the victim's many different names. 
12. We knew of the S.U.R. tattoo on the victim but did not attached any significance 
to the tattoo nor associate it with any known street gang. 
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13. Defendant did not give us a copy of the report from Dr. Grant ui even tell us about 
the mental health evaluation that Dr. Grant had performed. 
14 Defendant acted intelligent and articulate. He acted normal and never displayed 
any behavior that led us to believe that he suffered from a mental illness. 
15. We chose a trial strategy of self defense. It was consistent with the evidence and 
was in our opinion, Defendant's best hope for success. 
16. Prior to the trial, the prosecutor told me that Robert E. Young had asked for a deal 
on DUI, that occurred since the stabbing, in exchange for his testimony but that the prosecutor 
had refused the request. 
17. At trial, we chose not to impeach Mr. Young on the request for leniency because 
we felt the jury would have been offended by an attack of that sorts on an uninvolved witness. 
18. At the conclusion of the evidence we talked with Defendant about asking for a 
lessor included offense. Defendant thought we were winning and he did not want a lessor 
included instruction. 
19. Off the record, Judge Murphy asked us if we wanted any lessor included 
instructions. I said no. 
20. I read all the proposed jury instructions prior to telling the judge that we had no 
objections to all except the court's refusal to give our proposed instruction on reasonable doubt. 
Respectfully submitted this g £ day of December- , 1996 
MARKMOFFAaP 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
iss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mark Moffat, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he has read the foregoing 
Affidavit and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this £#& day of December, 1996 
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CERTIFICATE QF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 1996 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit Of Mark Moffat was delivered to: 
CLARK R. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1160 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
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